Vietnam War Statistics and Facts 6

[Text] In 1978 the Political General Department of the Vietnam People's Army adopted the policy of having cadres who worked and fought on the battlefields write memoirs about our nation's glorious war against the United States and recommended that I write about the B2 theater during the victorious spring of 1975: "How did the B2 theater carry out the mission assigned it by the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee?" How did it contribute to that glorious spring?"

Along with the other battlefields throughout the nation the B2 theater, in order to fulfill its glorious mission, contributed considerably to our people's great victory. The B2 theater and its people are proud of being part of the heroic Vietnamese fatherland, of the heroic Vietnamese people. Recalling and recording the events that occurred there is an honor and a responsibility of all cadres, enlisted men, and people of B2. I accepted the recommendation.

But I believe that the contributions of B2, one of the key war theaters, were not only its battles, its rice, its routes, and its people who sacrificed their lives, but also things that were much greater and which were valuable strategically and with regard to organizational art, and which by actually furthering the process of victory in the war contributed to the policies and lines of the Central Committee. They included not only heroic victories but also temporary, bitter defeats in certain places and at certain times, for they were all true and were valuable experiences. They are musical notes which are indispensable to composing the heroic symphony of the area. Therefore, to only record some events of the final victory, although it was a very great victory, would be a major deficiency. In order to .create a bright spring it is necessary to pass through a gloomy winter, and a victorious dry season can be based only on the rainy season of the preceding year. It is difficult to speak of the foliage without speaking of the roots, and to do so would be inaccurate.

Therefore, I decided to record what I knew and remembered of the B2 theater throughout the long anti-U.S. resistance war. That was not a simple matter, so it was necessary to spend a good deal of time thinking, seeking documents, meeting with cadres I once knew, and returning to the battlefields of the past, in order to find the truth, which changes very faithfully. It was necessary to request many comrades to lend their assistance and cooperation, and to add together the memories of many comrades holding many positions in many areas of the theater. But I was determined to succeed in that project, for I regarded it as my final responsibility toward the liberation war-one which I could not delegate to others-and toward B2, an area which I love and in which I lived and served for most of my life, from the days of secret political activity prior to the August Revolution to the complete victory which unified the fatherland, and which I may select as my final resting place.

B3, the Central Highlands region, consisted of the provinces of Gia Lai, Kontum, and Dae Lac. B4 was made up of Quang Tri Province and the former Thua Thien Province. B2 consisted of the rest of South Vietnam, from the former Gia Nghia Province (part of the present Dae Lac Province), Lam Dong, Thuan Hai, and on down to the Ca Mau Peninsula, Con Son, Ha Tien, and Phu Quoc. It included a vast jungle-and-mountains area, the tail of the great Truong Son mountain range. From mountain peaks north of Dalat and Lam Dong 1,500 to 2,000 meters high, the elevation gradually declines in the direction of eastern Nam Bo. Bordering that area is the vast, fertile, highly populated lowland area of the Mekong Delta, the location of such famous resistance war bases of the past and the U Minh forest, Dong Thap Muoi, etc. It is a flat, open, humid area with rice paddies alternating with gardens and hamlets and is intersected by such large rivers as the Dong Nai, Soai Rap, Vam Co, and Cuu Long, and a large number of small rivers, canals, and arroyos. Some areas are inundated practically the year round, or are wet 6 months and dry 6 months.

The road network in Nam Bo, the most highly developed in South Vietnam, was improved by the Americans to support their mechanized operations. Saigon,the capital of the lackey puppet administration, the largest city-at one time it had a population of 4 million-and the political, military, and economic center of South Vietnam, was situated in the center of the B2 theater and, along with many other large cities such as Da Lat, Phan Thiet, Bien Hoa, Tay Ninh, My Tho, Vinh Long, Can Tho, Ca Mau, and Rach Gia, formed a system of bases from which the U.S.-puppet operations were launched in all directions. It was also the center for the application of the neocolonial policy, a place where the debauched American

It must be added that about three-fourths of the border between our country and Kampuchea lay within the B2 theater. That area included land routes and river routes connecting the two countries, such as national routes 1, 22, and 13, the Mekong and So Thuong rivers, the Vinh Te Canal, and other roads and small rivers. The people of the two countries had always had good relations with each other in work and business. Friends, relatives, etc., usually experienced no problems in crossing the border by road, river, or canal. The destinies of the people on the two sides of the border have always been closely^ bound together and have fought shoulder-to-shoulder for the common well-being and shared good times and bad. That angered the enemy, who expanded their aggression and tried to sink their talons into both countries.

The people of B2 are proud of their indomitable national-salvation, revolutionary traditions of the past, such as the anti-French movements of Nguyen Trung True, Thien Ho Duong, Doc Binh Kieu, Thu Khoa Huan, and Truong Dinh, of the staunch patriotic spirit of Nguyen Dinh Chieu, etc., with the "clusters of leaves that hide the sky," Can Giuoc, and Go Cong, the "Eighteen Hamlets of Vuon Trau," Hoc Mon, Ba Diem, etc. B2 still cherishes the celebrated feats of arms of the cloth-shirted Nguyen Hue on the Rach Gam River, and still has fond memories of our wise leader Ho Chi Minh who led the way to national salvation, and lived in Phan Thiet City, Ben Nha Rong, etc. Then there was the blood shed by our predecessors in the Nam Ky uprising in 1940, the August Revolution in 1945, etc. All of those things continually reminded and encouraged the people of B2 to be prepared to arise, once they had awakened, and sacrifice everything for independence and freedom.

In writing these thoughts and memories, I hope only to fulfill the obligations of a soldier who was fortunate enough to have lived and operated in a glorious era of the fatherland and of the people, and above all his obligation toward B2 or, more accurately, toward the people of B2, whom I love, all the people in the cities and in the rural areas, living scattered about the jungles, the mountains, and the maquis or concentrated in the subwards and villages.

Especially, toward my friends, relatives, comrades, and fellow unit members, people I knew as well as those I didn't know, who were from all over the country,from Lang Son to the Ca Mau Peninsula, who fell in the B2 theater and whose blood stained every inch of the B2 theater so that we could win independence and freedom, and who sacrificed everything so that the North and South could be united and work together in building socialism. They were people who had great merit toward the great recent victory of our people and the homeland.

Only they, people who never thought of themselves and contributed their entire lives, are worthy of living in the memories of thousands of future generations. That very sacred mission, which is also an order of history and the people, is to faithfully record and correctly evaluate the developments and events, and the hardships and noble sacrifices of the land and people of B2 which I witnessed, know about, and still remember.

Of course, because my knowledge and writing ability are limited, and because an article or book can only concentrate on a certain number of matters, I unfortunately could not deal with all of the miraculous accomplishments of the Vietnamese in the B2 theater, who resolutely, heroically, and creatively responded to the skilled leadership and guidance of the party Central Committee throughout the long and glorious resistance war and contributed their effort and skill to the historic resistance war. I only hope to record some of those events within the limits of my understanding, in order to make a small contribution to the people who are still alive today and to those of future generations. To do so is also to make a small payment on the debt I owe to the people who gave there lives in the B2 theater for their nation and class.

Because of that heavy responsibility, I decided to write only the complete truth, the truth that everyone knows as well as the truth some people do not yet know, which some people like and other people do not like. History is always truthful and will mercilessly eliminate what is not true, if not today then tomorrow. I hope that the readers everywhere, especially those who operated in the B2 theater, will contribute opinions and supplement the deficiencies and the omissions. I will be very pleased and grateful.

I would like to thank the comrades in the war recapitulation sections of the Ministry of National Defense, Military Region 7, Military Region 9, and Ho Chi Minh City, and the comrades who were members of the provincial unit commands in B2. My special thanks go to comrades Senior Colonel Nguyen Viet Ta and Captain Vo Iran Nha, who devoted much effort to assembling documents and contacting the localities, and who contributed worthily to the contents of this book. Spring, 1980

Even so, news that the Paris Agreement had been signed caused everyone to breathe a sigh of relief. Joyful expressions appeared on the faces of the commanders. Those faces were all weatherworn: everyone looked thin but healthy. Was that not a valuable prize for nearly 10 months of continuous fighting all over the theater to force the enemy to sign an agreement to end hostilities and conclude a strategic phase?

Never before had a military activity campaign been as prolonged and as increasingly intensive as during the recent period. The military regions and units reported to the Regional Command the victories they had won, and the positions our troops had taken from the enemy hour by hour, but at the same time there were continual reports about the difficulties, the shortages of troops, food, and ammunition, and especially the fatigue of the cadres and men. The Military Region 9 Command (western Nam Bo) sent a message recommending straightforwardly that the Regional Command order an immediate cessation of hostilities so that we could reorganize our forces. The troops were no longer capable of fighting! But the enemy was extremely obstinate. They had been painfully defeated on the battlefield, had been outnegotiated at the conference

The difficulty was deciding what to do at that time. If we stopped, things would go in one direction. If we made a little more effort and won a few more victories we would bring about a qualitative change and things would go in another direction. That is what we did. We made a little more effort and won a few more victories in South Vietnam at a time when it was thought that we were exhausted and could no longer fight because we were out of rice and

ammunition. We were steadfast, fought back intelligently and proudly, and shot down large numbers of B52fs and other airplanes during 12 long days and nights in Hanoi and Hai Phong, as if something miraculous had happened, as in the ancient myth of Lac and the dragon. And clearly, we were able to create a new quality. The enemy-the leading, most dangerous and cruelest imperialist country of the era-had to bow its head and submit. They had to sign an agreement to end the war and restore peace in Vietnam and agree to completely withdraw the U.S. and puppet troops from South Vietnam and recognize the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Vietnam.

We were monitoring the situation on the battlefield and the units, but our focus was on urgently discussing a plan and measures for implementing the Paris Agreement strictly and effectively. Many tasks had to be carried out: quickly reorganizing our forces, being vigilant toward the enemy, whom we had known well for a long time, etc. Suddenly a staff cadre entered and handed comrade Nam Nga (i.e. Maj Gen Nguyen Minh Chau), regional chief of staff at that time, an urgent message. Comrade Nam Nga quickly read the message then, with

a serious expression that could have meant either happiness or worry, handed it to me. The message said that the Central Committee had appointed me head of the military delegation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission in Saigon. Oh! How sudden! The Central Office [COSVN] and the Regional Military Party Committee had decided on the make-up of the delegation in advance, and it had already been approved by the Central Committee, but now there was a sudden,

During my several decades as a soldier I had experienced many surprises, on the battlefield, in my work, and from people-both friends and enemies-but that surprise both pleased and worried me. It worried me because I was unfamiliar with such work and the time was too pressing: I had to pack and set out before I had time to get a handle on the job, let alone making full preparations for the new struggle front, which was completely different from the battlefield. However, that was not the first time I had been surprised by an assignment from the upper echelon. I was used to it. I had confidence in the

the era of the French colonialists, I had lived, engaged in seething revolutionary activities, won victories, and tasted defeat there. I had been away from the city fighting for decades, and was now returning in full view of thepeople and my comrades, and within the thick encirclement of the enemy. The streets, markets, factories, poor workers' neighborhoods which I knew in the past had now certainly changed greatly, but even so I still had memories of other people from Saigon, like myself, who decided to leave so that they could later return in triumph. Once before I had tried to return but couldn't.

This time, although it was not to be a permanent return, was as delightful as a beautful dream. Every minute many imagined images of Saigon, both in the past and in the present, passed across my mind like a roll of film. When he saw me sitting in silence, comrade Muoi Khang (i.e. Senior General Hoang Van Thai, then a lieutenant general), asked me, "What else can you do but accept the mission? Congratulations!"

When I went back to my house and looked around at what had been familiar surroundings for years, I was suddenly saddened by the prospect of leaving. A light breeze blew in, bringing along the sweet scents of a myriad of flowers in the green jungle. In front of the house, in a narrow field extending along the valley, flocks of small birds hastily gleaned the grains of rice which were dropped during the recent harvest. The stream running along the fields was winding its way under rows of trees that were leafless because of the bombing and shelling. There had just appeared a few fresh young saplings. Every object that day seemed to have an overflowing, fresh, affectionate soul. I don't know how long I would have sat there meditating if Chin Vinh (Maj Gen Tran Do) and Hai Le (Maj Gen Le Van Tuong), the deputy political officer and

I agreed to maintain unchanged everything that had been arranged, and only requested the addition of comrade Tu Bon (Senior Colonel Nguyen Huu Tri), an intelligence cadre and Army Hero who had lived in Saigon more than 3 years and who had come to the base only a few months previously, after learning that he had been compromised. He was an expert on Saigon and knew all of its streets and many people in various circles in the city. In addition to helping me carry out a number of tasks, he would be my driver if the enemy agreed to let us provide our own drivers.

Now, faced with a new mission, I would meet the enemy face to face and would of course have to choose a name. Almost without thinking, I took the name "Nguyen Viet Chau," the name of a younger brother with whom I had been very close and who was killed in 1969 when he was presiding over a meeting of the party committee of Can Tho City, My brother and I had lived in Saigon, had participated together in secret revolutionary activity there during the period of French domination, had been released from a French prison at the same time,had participated together in the August 1945 uprising, and had left our beloved Saigon to take part in the resistance war. Now I was returning to that city and naturally thought about my esteemed younger brother, my comrade in death as well as in life. I was happy to take that unforgettable name. But then ond day, during an ordinary meal at the Regional Command at which Bay Cuong (comrade Pham Hung, a member of the Political Bureau and secretary of COSVN) was present, I suddenly remembered that I was not returning to Saigon as a stranger but was going under an assumed name, which would be inconvenient.

Many of the people of Saigon could not forget their children who had gone to fight in the resistance war years ago and in whom they had placed their confidence and hope. And a considerable number of the enemy, such as Tran Thien Khiem, the puppet premier, Lam Van Phat, a puppet major general, and a number of others, knew me. After graduating from the French military academy in Dalat they went to Dong Thap Muoi to join the resistance.

As the commander of Military Region 8 at that time, I accepted and sent them to study and practice at the military region military administration school. But then, because they could not bear the hardships and did not love their country or their people, they deserted, surrendered to the French, and continued to serve their French, and the American, masters. Even the Americans might have dozens of photographs of me. Thus it would be best to use a name with which everyone, friend and foe alike, was familiar. The members of COSVN and the Regional Military Party Commission agreed. Thus I recommended that the Central Committee agree to the change and send a message to Paris so that the other side could be informed that the head of the delegation of the PRG of the RSVN would be Lt Gen Tran Van Tra*

Within a short period of time I drafted a plan to prepare in all ways for my new assignment, reviewed the organization of the delegation, and discussed in detail with Ba Tran (Maj Gen Tran Van Danh) the mission, personnel, documents, and facilities, especially the communications-liaison facilities, foresaw contingencies, decided on the measures, and assigned Ba Tran, the deputy delegation head, to represent me in directing all implementation tasks.

I emphasized that if the enemy respected us at the four-party conference table in Saigon and we were victorious in implementing the Paris Agreements, that it would principally be due to the strength of our troops and to our comrades on the outside. We promised that we would be worthy of being representatives of the heroic people's armed liberation forces of the South in the middle of the enemy's capital and in the bosom of our beloved compatriots.

brigade. It had an airfield, a supply depot, and a drill ground. From it were launched sweeping operations in the surrounding areas. At the beginning of 1972-by that time the puppet army had replaced the Americans-Thien Ngon was the main focus of the "Nguyen Hue" campaign.* In the course of our campaign we completely eliminated that strongpoint. Thus Thien Ngon was then only an old, desolate battlefield on which the vegetation had been burned ^nd the surface of which was scarred by bomb and shell craters and littered with the hulks of U.S. tanks, armored vehicles, artillery and trucks, which were strewn all over. There remained only a runway usuable only by helicopters.

After informing the enemy of the pick-up time we sent a reconnaissance team to Thien Ngon to rebuild some old bunkers, in which we would await the enemy before, during and after the appointed time. The members of that team reported to us every 15 minutes on all developments in the situation there. Meanwhile, a fully equipped delegation of cadres prepared our actual departure point at the Loc Ninh airfield. Our delegation organized a leisurely Tet celebration in advance. We knew that when we arrived in Saigon we would have to urgently begin work, even though the lunar New Year was only 4 or 5 days away, so we wanted to enjoy a Tet "at home," in our free, liberated area, that was embued

with friendship between those leaving and those remaining behind. Celebrate Tet in advance! We were only repeating something that had happened several times in the history of our people's combat. Quang Trung-Nguyen Hue had his troops celebrate Tet in advance in 1789 at the Tarn Diep bivouac area before they advanced on Thang Long, destroyed the Manchu-Ch'ing army, won a brilliant victory at Dong Da, and permanently ended the Chinese protectorate in our country.

not very elegant but there were Tet cakes, including glutinous rice cakes, pork,both from pigs we had raised and from wild pigs, and with watermelon, liqueur,local products, and products from Hanoi. The comrades at COSVN, the Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, the government, and the Regional Command,representatives of the mass association organs, and even a reporter from the liberation press, etc., joined in the festivities with the members of our delegation.

received a message from Thien Ngon: "At the appointed hour the U.S. helicopters did not arrive to pick up the delegation. Instead, two enemy airplanes circled twice and dropped bombs around the air strip. Bomb fragments and fragments of the hulks of tanks and armored vehicles flew over our bunker. Then there was silence." Everyone poured some more liqueur and lifted their glasses to toast

the U.S.-puppet capability to violate the Paris Agreements, and the complications of our mission and of our work on the battlefield. Despite all that, everyone was burning with strong confidence, confidence in the inevitability of our victory under any circumstances. Everyone's eyes were alive with the brilliant vitality of spring. Outside, rays of sunlight shining through the foliage illuminated the jungle. The weather was dry, cool and pleasant. Everywhere, along the roads, there were streaks of white flowers, interspersed with the shiny golden color of wild apricot blossoms. This year spring came early in the base area, and the vegetation seemed to compete in responding to the happiness of victory.

Nam Bo, was situated 100 kilometers from Saigon on National Route 13, which extends into Kampuchea and then Laos. Extending northward was National Route 14> which went to Ban Me Thuot and the Central Highlands. Extending southward was Route 17, which connected with our northern Tay Ninh base area. After it was liberated in April 1972, Loc Ninh became an important military position which threatened the enemy's defense of Saigon, and was a political center of the liberated B2 area. Loc Ninh, in the fertile red-soil area, which was appropriate for the growing of tropical crops, had vast rubber plantations left over from the French colonial period and luxuriant orchards of all kinds of fruit-durians, rambutans, mangos, milk fruit, etc.-and hundreds of hectares of valuable pepper and coffee. In the past Loc Ninh had been a district seat in Binh Long Province, a strong point which lay within the puppet III Corps' outerperimeter for the defense of Saigon. During our "Nguyen Hue" campaign, Loc

be taken on the enemy's outer defensive perimeter. We not only wiped out a fortified brigade-level base but also wiped out many tank and armored regiments and many powerful task forces of the puppets' III Corps, and captured many POW's and officers, including Colonel Vinh, whom we later, out of humanitarianism and to demonstrate our good will, returned to the United States and its puppets.

the waiting American helicopters. Many delegates representing the various circles and mass associations arose to make brief speeches in which they demanded peace and national concord, congratulated our delegation, and expressed confidence in the inevitable victory of the delegation's struggle. On behalf of the delegation, I expressed its gratitude to the cadres, enlisted men, and people who had come to applaud and solemnly see off the delegation, acknowledged the advice given the delegation, and promised to be worthy of that confidence.

charge of propaganda-training in the region, with whom I had once traveled the entire length of the Truong Son trail. Comrade Thuong promised, "I'll send you a photograph I took of the people seeing you and our delegation off to Saigon." Our delegation members waved to the people, then the comrades, two abreast, solemnly boarded the helicopters, amidst the affection of the people and the forest of flags and flowers. The U.S. major commanding my helicopter

was very polite, carefully inspecting my seat, then stepped down, stood at attention and saluted, invited me to board the helicopter, fastened my safety belt, then sat down in his seat. The helicopters took off in an orderly formation, circled once above the airfield, then headed straight for Saigon along Route 13. The large number of people at the airfield were not the only ones seeing us off: nearly everyone, people traveling along the road, standing in their yards and on the streets, or working in the rice paddies and potato fields around Loc Ninh stopped work to wave at us. That was an extremely

house, including a living room, an office, a dining room, a bedroom and a bathroom. There was a door to each of the rooms, and there were airconditioning,bright lights, a telephone and other conveniences. We clearly understood their "good intentions." Therefore, we moved into other rooms and lived and worked with the others. We turned that house over to specialists so that they could inspect it. After searching around for days they showed us some very small microphones they had found under tables in the offices and livingrooms. We joked with one another that we didn't know whether they had been put there by

members of the joint military commissions and teams by throwing rocks and trash, and even using steel rods, knives, and hammers to wound our men, such as Major Le Thanh Nhon and two captains on the Buon Me Thuot team, and six of our comrades at Hue. Comrade Tran Hon Ngo was hit on the head and knocked unconscious at Due Pho in Quang Ngai Province while he was working with an investigation team of the joint commission. All of our officers and men in the joint

Now, on the new struggle front in the area controlled by the enemy,they always had confidence in the just cause and in the inevitable victory of the revolution, were very calm and steadfast, and did not waver in the face of ugly acts, intimidation, or attempted bribery. We are very proud of them and are grateful to the troops of Uncle Ho who were very ordinary but were indomitable,had military bearing and didn't blink an eye.

appointment of an investigating team. I agreed to the investigation but stressed that since the Four-Party Joint Military Commission had not yet reached agreement regarding the flight paths, altitude, etc., of airplanes flying over areas controlled by the liberation troops, no one can accept responsibility for their safety. Ultimately, the Americans had to shut up and forget the incident.

was 100 percent guilty of a violation it would still argue obstinately, regardless of our protests. An example was the puppets1 taking of Sa Huynh in Quang Ngai which we had liberated in 1972, along with a relatively long stretch of National Route 1. After the ceasefire took effect the puppets launched a division-sized operation to retake that area in order to restore their communications on Route 1. We vigorously exposed that violation and demanded that an investigation team be sent there, but the Americans and puppets ignored our demand and considered the incident closed. After 28 January the enemy also

In that area, because our forces were not on guard and were afraid that if they retaliated they would violate the agreements, the enemy was able to occupy those places and fraudulently claim at the conference table that the area belonged to them. The ceasefire was the heart of the agreement but the Thieu puppet regime completely ignored it and brazenly sabotaged the heart of the agreement. Their 1973 "Ly Thuong Kiet" plan set forth five major strategic goals:

in the United States that "After the Americans withdraw, the Republic of Vietnam must continue to be strong." That work continued at a rapid pace after the agreement took effect. Many documents have clearly recorded the figures, the world press had written much about them, and there are ample statistics, so I believe that it is unnecessary to repeat them here. Furthermore the U.S. and vassal troops were required to withdraw completely from South Vietnam in accordance with the agreement, but they turned over to Thieu's army their modern equipment supply depots, and bases.

and military personnel, including military technical personnel, military personnel attached to the pacification program, and the weapons, ammunition, and war materiel of the United States and the other foreign countries, would have to be completely withdrawn from South Vietnam within 60 days after the signing of the agreement, and that all military bases of the United States and the other foreign countries were to be dismantled. The protocol on the ceasefire also stated in Article 8 that "The United States and the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 5 of the agreement will take with them all of their weapons, ammunition and military equipment."

by the U.S. delegation. No one can believe the 8,000 figure or any other figure Major General Woodward gives out, without thinking that it could be false. I believe that any withdrawal of U.S. troops or the troops of any other foreign country must be announced in advance so that there can be on the-spot monitoring and inspection by the Four-Party Joint Military Commission as well as the control and supervision of the International Commission, as has been stipulated. Otherwise, no figures can have any value. As far as I am concerned, to date not a single U.S. soldier, or a soldier from any other country, has left South Vietnam."

not officially agreeing that joint four-party military teams could go to the various locations to observe the withdrawal of U.S. and South Korean troops and could take photographs. Thus they had to make a concession. From those observations it was clear that although when they arrived in Vietnam the U.S. and South Korean troops had been armed to the teeth, when they left they carried no weapons at all, but only sleeping bags, personal effects, and such tacky souvenirs as earthenware and porcelain elephants, stonewar from Marble Mountain, etc. When our men asked about that they were told, "Our weapons and equipment have been sent by ship." Such was their deception!

"My dear Ambassador Gauvin, you have spoken very accurately of the very important role and the very necessary objectivity of the International Commission for Control and Supervision in implementing the agreement. I am sincerely sorry that the sound of gunfire can be heard all over, that although agreement has been reached to end the war and restore peace in Vietnam the devastating war of the past several decades is continuing, I believe that no people in the world desire peace more ardently than the people of Vietnam, who

Before and after the Paris Agreement the Americans shipped weapons and equipment to the ARVN so that it could sabotage the agreement and carry out landgrabbing and pacification campaigns. Furthermore, although the U.S. and other foreign troops returned to their countries they left their weapons, facilities, supply depots, and bases to the army of the Thieu regime, which was a brazen violation of the Paris Agreement."

Americans who had sold themselves to the Americans to participate in killing our people, such as the Australians, New Zealanders, Thai, and South Koreans, had completely withdrawn from our country. In the morning of 15 March 1973 USARV, the U.S. Army Command in Vietnam, conducted a flag-folding ceremony and bugged out. In the afternoon, MACV, the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, actually the U.S. GHQ which commanded all U.S. troops, the vassal troops, and ThieuTs army and the imposing U.S. aggressive war apparatus in Vietnam, the Tan Son Nhat headquarters of which had been dubbed the "Pentagon of the East" by the press, also pulled down and folded its flag.

Whether by accident or by clever design, the next day the military delegations of the DRV and the PRG of the RSVN drove into the courtyard of that "Pentagon of the East." The two delegations got out of their cars and advanced directly into the reception room, past two rows of American MP's who stood at attention and saluted, in order to attend a party organized by the major general who headed the U.S. delegation. We laughed, drank American whiskey, and talked about the weather and peace in Vietnam, in the "Pentagon of the East."

With regard to the exchange of prisoners in accordance with the agreement, we succeeded in securing the release of our people who had been captured during the war. Maj Nguyen Thi Dung, a member of our military delegation, was responsible for the POW exchange. She was very active and aggressive, visiting all of the puppet prisons, from Bien Hoa to Con Dao and Phu Quoc. She was the only female member of the four military delegations, spoke French and English fluently, was

attractive and polite, and struggled resolutely, which won the respect of the Americans and puppets. We were proud of her. She worked at disseminating the articles of the agreement regarding the exchange of POW's to our men who were still imprisoned, struggled for the improvement of prison conditions, and demanded the return of those who were still detained. The enemy did not return everyone and were not sincere, but we were able to liberate a considerable number of our cadres and men, people who had fought heroically but had fallen into the hands of the enemy and had been subjected to their barbarous treatment.

the American people, and in bringing the U.S. troops home, as demanded by the American people. Otherwise, they continued to implement their policy of Vietnamizing the war so that they could remain in Vietnam. The puppets adhered to ThieuTs "four nos" slogan: no concession of land to the "communists," no neutrality, no coalition with the "communists," and no talking with the "communists."

and waved to everyone. Thus aboard the American C130 (the Americans were courteous enough to provide a seat for me in the cockpit) I, Lt Col Nguyen Quang Minh (a research cadre with the Joint Commission), Dr Le Hoai Liem, the intepreter Dung, the bodyguard Hoa, and a number of other cadres, would fly from Saigon to Hanoi, thus ending 60 days of very seething and tense activity in the bosom of the enemy.

The Only Path Is That of Revolutionary Violence Immediately after I arrived in Hanoi I met with leaders of the party, the government, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to report on the work of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, on what had been accomplished and what had not yet been accomplished, on my conclusions after 60 days of face-to-face meetings with the Americans and puppets,on my observations regarding the situation, etc. I listened to their good observations and evaluations regarding the work of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, the enemy plots, and what we would do next. Then I was granted several days1 leave, after which I prepared for and participated in a plenary session of the Political Bureau of the party Central Committee regarding the situation and mission of the revolution in South Vietnam.

Therefore, if common evaluations and policies were based on the actual developments, dangerous mistakes would be made if the theater was not representative of all the rest or was not strategically important with regard to the war as a whole* If, while the war situation was changing, we did not correctly evaluate the role of each theater, mistakes would be made in organizing and deploying forces, and in adopting strategic, campaign and tactical policies, which would of course affect victory or defeat in the war. It was not that no mistakes were made in our war against the U.S. aggressors to liberate the nation. But thanks to the wise, democratic and centralized leadership of our party we were able to promptly correct our mistakes and win victory. Revolution is an undertaking of the masses. Each success or defeat of the revolution in each phase is a success or defeat of the thought and acts of millions of people, especially the collective leadership. It was never a case of "failures are due to you and successes are due to me." In each phase of the revolution, at each historical turning point, correct policies and actions are always the results of collective thought and knowledge, of the combination of many minds, from the mind of the highest leader to the minds of the enlisted men and ordinary people when, out of patriotism and love for the people, they plunge into the actual,specific, lively tasks on the battlefield: No one is always right and no one is always wrong, for everyone is human. What is noblest and wisest is to recognize one's mistakes and resolutely and promptly correct them. Even collective leadership is not always right. But it is certain that the collective leadership makes fewer mistakes than individual leaders. President Ho, the talented leader of our party and our nation, recapitulated and heightened the tradition of our party and nation by means of a very concise but very profound sentence:

strength was between 700,000 and 1.1 million, while our forces on the battlefield amounted to at most one-third those of the enemy. It would be incorrect to conclude from that that the puppets were strong and we were week. In addition to those material numbers, it is necessary to add together many other factors, such as the morale of the soldiers, the deployment of units and their missions in campaign and strategic plans, in attacks and defense today and tomorrow, etc. That is not to mention much broader factors, such as the political factor, the combat objectives, the factor of the people. Our just

nothing is completely correct. One should not fear speaking about mistakes,but only fear not realizing or correcting mistakes. But every time the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy it is possible to be rightist and fear the enemy or to be leftist, subjective and faltering in policies and actions. For that reason, evaluations of the situation and of the balance of forces must be based on lines and policies, collective intelligence and on actual developments.

Despite that, should we voluntarily withdraw our forces from the areas controlled by the enemy and the contested areas to the rear in order to consolidate them, and ourselves erase the very effective "comb's teeth11 position of the revolution, which terrified the enemy? By doing so would we not give the enemy a hand so that they could do other, more important things, which they had been unable to do after many years of fierce attacks and pacification?

in the annihilation of each battalion and regiment of the puppet 7th Division, in coordination with the uprising of the people, in order to liberate the Tien Giang area. With its example of glorious combat, the regiment, along with the other units and localities all over the battlefield, provided the B2 theater with valuable experience. Because of such models on the battlefield, the comrades in COSVN and the Regional Party military Commission would not agree to withdraw their forces to the rear, but gave the order to consolidate and reorganize on the spot and maintain the interspersed position in the three areas, and positively reported that opinion to the Central Committee.

and were fiercely competing with each other; it was constantly undergoing upheaval and change, at times every day and every hour. In that area most of the popular masses supported the revolution and there were all kinds of revolutionary forces and organizations. District and provincial local troops often operated there, and at times a main-force unit of the military zone or of the upper echelon came into the area to fight the enemy and support the local

The Paris Agreement did not end the struggle between revolution and counterrevolution and could not immediately end the armed struggle, for the enemy committed violations and grabbed land as described above, hoping to achieve the result of there being only one regime-the puppet regime-and one army-the puppet army. Thus the viewpoint that we should form only two clear areas-the enemy area and our area-in order to have struggle guidelines appropriate to each other in order to immediately stabilize the situation, and so that we could consolidate and rebuild our weakened armed forces and build up economy and governmental administration was completely inappropriate. I still remember that in the meeting held by the comrades in COSVN to prepare for the

jet combat aircraft and very modern weapons, so much so that in 1975, when the U.S. Congress forbade the continuation of combat aid, Thieu still felt secure because of the commitments made by Nixon. The aid program and our promises caused Thieu to have a false sense of security, as a result of which Thieu turned down all efforts toward reconciliation or negotiations with the opposition and ignored the Paris Agreement. During the first year after the signing of the agreement, Thieu carried out small attacks and pushed the communists from a number of areas in the Mekong Delta and along the coast, set up outposts there, and resettled refugees in the newly occupied areas, and even had his troops raid Kampuchea."